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Summary
Background Since June, 2012, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has, worldwide, caused 
104 infections in people including 49 deaths, with 82 cases and 41 deaths reported from Saudi Arabia. In addition to 
conﬁ rming diagnosis, we generated the MERS-CoV genomic sequences obtained directly from patient samples to 
provide important information on MERS-CoV transmission, evolution, and origin.
Methods Full genome deep sequencing was done on nucleic acid extracted directly from PCR-conﬁ rmed clinical samples. 
Viral genomes were obtained from 21 MERS cases of which 13 had 100%, four 85–95%, and four 30–50% genome 
coverage. Phylogenetic analysis of the 21 sequences, combined with nine published MERS-CoV genomes, was done.
Findings Three distinct MERS-CoV genotypes were identiﬁ ed in Riyadh. Phylogeographic analyses suggest the MERS-
CoV zoonotic reservoir is geographically disperse. Selection analysis of the MERS-CoV genomes reveals the expected 
accumulation of genetic diversity including changes in the S protein. The genetic diversity in the Al-Hasa cluster 
suggests that the hospital outbreak might have had more than one virus introduction.
Interpretation We present the largest number of MERS-CoV genomes (21) described so far. MERS-CoV full genome 
sequences provide greater detail in tracking transmission. Multiple introductions of MERS-CoV are identiﬁ ed and 
suggest lower R0 values. Transmission within Saudi Arabia is consistent with either movement of an animal reservoir, 
animal products, or movement of infected people. Further deﬁ nition of the exposures responsible for the sporadic 
introductions of MERS-CoV into human populations is urgently needed.
Funding Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health, Wellcome Trust, European Community, and National Institute of Health 
Research University College London Hospitals Biomedical Research Centre.
Introduction
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a newly 
described disease in human beings, ﬁ rst reported from 
Saudi Arabia in September, 2012, after identiﬁ cation of a 
novel betacoronavirus (MERS-CoV) from a Saudi Arabian 
patient who died from a severe respiratory illness.1 As of 
Sept 12, 2013, there have been 114 laboratory-conﬁ rmed 
cases of MERS-CoV infections with 54 deaths reported to 
WHO.2 All cases have been directly or indirectly linked to 
one of four countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates), with most 
cases (90 cases and 44 deaths) reported from Saudi 
Arabia, occurring as sporadic, family, or hospital clus-
ters.2 Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV has 
been documented in England, France, Tunisia, Italy, and 
Saudi Arabia.
Coronaviruses are a family of viruses infecting birds 
and mammals. The animal source and mode of 
transmission of MERS-CoV to human beings is not 
known. This information is essential for developing 
inter ventions for reducing the risk of transmission and 
developing eﬀ ective control measures. During the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) 
epidemic between Nov, 2002, and July, 2003, molecular 
analysis of SARS-CoV from patients from various 
geographical regions was essential for understanding 
viral evolution and the spread of the disease.3 Phylo-
genetic analysis suggested that SARS-CoV probably 
originated in bats and spread to people. A genetic link 
between the SARS-CoV in people and in civets revealed 
cross-host evolution.4
There is currently little information about the molecu-
lar evolution of MERS-CoV and how this relates to virus 
transmission. The cellular receptor for MERS-CoV has 
been identiﬁ ed as dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4, CD26)5 
and the structure of the receptor binding domain of the 
virus spike protein complexed with DPP4 has been 
established.6 The tissue distribution of this receptor 
within mammals is consistent with the lung and kidney 
pathology of the virus.5 The conservation of the receptor 
across mammals suggests many possible non-human 
hosts; however, so far no animal reservoir has been 
identiﬁ ed for MERS-CoV. The closest relative to MERS-
CoV was identiﬁ ed through phylogenetic analysis of 
a short fragment sequenced from the bat species 
Neoromicia zuluensis.7 However, in view of the estimated 
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evolutionary rate of MERS-CoV, the most recent 
common ancestor between this isolate and MERS-CoV 
existed in bats more than 44 years ago.8 A recent 
serological study of dromedary camels in Oman and the 
Canary Islands found cross-reactive antibodies to MERS-
CoV, but the investigators were unable to amplify any 
MERS-CoV-like viral sequences from the samples.9 
A small fragment of sequence identical to the EMC/2012 
MERS-CoV has been reported from a Taphozous 
perforatus bat captured in Saudi Arabia, suggesting a 
regionally relevant bat reservoir.10
Genomic sequencing of MERS-CoV is important, and 
molecular epidemiology can reveal spatiotemporal 
patterns that help identify whether all MERS-CoV 
infections originated from a single zoonotic event, with 
subsequent human-to-human transmission, or from 
many zoonotic events at several geographic locations. This 
information is crucial for an accurate assessment of the 
epidemic potential of MERS-CoV.11 In addition to con-
ﬁ rming diagnosis, generating sequence data directly from 
epidemiologically deﬁ ned cases provides the essential 
basis for deﬁ ning the spread, evolution, and origin of 
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Figure 1: Deep sequencing process
Products of RT-PCR ampliﬁ cation of MERS-CoV patient RNA (A). All expected products are 2–3 kb in length, with amplicons 9/11 and 10/11 producing 6 and 4 kb 
products. DNA marker sizes are shown in kb. (B) 100 000 random reads (a tenth of the entire sample dataset for Al-Hasa_19) were mapped to the Al-Hasa_1_2013 
genome. The histogram shows the positions of each read across the genome with 100–1000 reads at each position across the entire genome. The actual coverage is 
ten times greater, yielding 1000–10 000 coverage. Open reading frame (ORF) map (C) of a successfully assembled Al-Hasa_19 genome. An open box shows open 
reading frames of 100 codons or greater in length. Stop codons are shown by vertical black lines. The ﬁ rst ATG in each ORF is shown by a vertical red line. 
MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
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MERS-CoV infections. Here we report MERS-CoV 
genomes obtained directly from 21 patients with MERS 
from across Saudi Arabia and assess the spatiotemporal 
distribution of MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia.
Methods
Screening tests and genome sequencing
Clinical samples were screened with RT-PCR, as 
described elsewhere,12,13 with ampliﬁ cation targeting both 
the upE and ORF1A for conﬁ rmation. Deep sequencing 
was done on nucleic acid extracted from real-time PCR 
conﬁ rmed cases of MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia. Typically 
50 μL of nucleic acid was generated from 200 μL of 
tracheal aspirate or from a nasopharyngeal or throat 
swab with automated processing. PCR ampliﬁ ed DNA 
amplicons covering the entire MERS-CoV genome were 
prepared as described elsewhere.14 The PCR amplicons 
for each sample were pooled for Illumina library 
(Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA) preparation with each 
sample processed to include a unique barcode sequence. 
Standard MiSeq 150 base pair paired-end reads were 
generated. Sequence data were de-multiplexed into 
sample-speciﬁ c readsets, processed to remove primer 
sequences at the ends of reads, and trimmed from their 
3ʹ end until the median phred-scaled quality score was 
>35·0, discarding reads smaller than 125 nucleotides. 
The processed readsets were assembled into large 
contiguous sequences (contigs) using the de-novo 
assembler SPAdes.15 The readset was also mapped 
against the Al-Hasa_1_2013 genome (GenBank accession 
number KF18656716) using SMALT (version 0.5.0) to 
generate a reference-based consensus. In cases where 
the de-novo assembly was split over several contigs, they 
were aligned against the reference-based consensus 
before merging. Any diﬀ erences between de-novo and 
reference-based methods were resolved by direct 
examination of the original read set.
Phylogenetic analyses
The 13 complete genomes and eight 32% or greater 
genomes were aligned with the nine published MERS-
CoV genomes (GenBank accession numbers JX869059, 
KC776174, KC667074, KF192507, KF186564, KF186565, 
KF186566, KF186567, plus England2_HPA, not yet in 
GenBank) using MEGA5.17 The ends of the alignment 
were trimmed to the longest shared sequence, and the 
Bayesian inference of the phylogeny done using 
MRBAYES version 3.2.118 under a GTR+Γ4 substitution 
model. The hypothetical ancestral sequences were gener-
ated with a likelihood-based ancestral recon struction 
method implemented in HYPHY version 2.1.2.19 Custom 
Python scripts were used to determine non-synonymous 
changes along each internal branch of the phylogeny.
A subalignment of the 20 sequences comprising the Al-
Hasa outbreak was generated to assess the trans mission 
dynamics of the hospital outbreak. The number of 
nucleotide diﬀ erences between each pair of sequences 
Type of sample used 
as source of viral 
nucleic acid
Proportion 
of MERS-CoV 
genome*
Patient† Sample date GenBank 
accession 
number
Al_Hasa_1_2013 Tracheal aspirate 100% V May 9, 2013 KF186567
Al_Hasa_2_2013 Tracheal aspirate 100% J April 21, 2013 KF186566
Al_Hasa_3_2013 Tracheal aspirate 99·9% I April 22, 2013 KF186565
Al-Hasa_7_2013 Tracheal aspirate 92·8% H May 1, 2013 KF600623, 
KF600655
Al_Hasa_4_2013 Tracheal aspirate 99·9% K May 1, 2013 KF186564
Al-Hasa_15_2013 Tracheal aspirate 99·9% Y May 11, 2013 KF600645
Al-Hasa_16_2013 Tracheal aspirate 99·9% T May 12, 2013 KF600644
Al-Hasa_13_2013 Nasopharyngeal swab 37·5% Q May 7, 2013 KF600616, 
KF600637, 
KF600640, 
KF600650, 
KF600656
Al-Hasa_22_2013 Tracheal aspirate 46·8% X May 9, 2013 KF600617, 
KF600619, 
KF600621, 
KF600625, 
KF600631, 
KF600633
Al-Hasa_9_2013 Tracheal aspirate 46·1% F May 1, 2013 KF600622, 
KF600639, 
KF600648, 
KF600649, 
KF600654
Al-Hasa_10_2013 Nasopharyngeal swab 32·0% M May 2, 2013 KF600614, 
KF600624, 
KF600629, 
KF600636, 
KF600641, 
KF600642, 
KF600646, 
KF600653
Al-Hasa_11_2013 Tracheal aspirate 90·5% G May 3, 2013 KF600629, 
KF600636, 
KF600646
Al-Hasa_8_2013 Nasopharyngeal swab 73·8% O May 1, 2013 KF600618, 
KF600626, 
KF600635, 
KF600638
Al-Hasa_14_2013 Nasopharyngeal swab 75·2% S May 8, 2013 KF600615, 
KF600643
Al-Hasa_12_2013 Nasopharyngeal swab 99·9% B May 7, 2013 KF600627
Riyadh_1_2012 Tracheal aspirate 99·8% RY1‡ Oct 23, 2012 KF600612
Riyadh_2_2012 Nasopharyngeal swab 99·9% RY2§ Oct 30, 2012 KF600652
Buraidah_1_2013 Unknown source 99·9% BR1 May 13, 2013 KF600630
Al-Hasa_17_2013 Tracheal aspirate 100% AH17 May 15, 2013 KF600647
Al-Hasa_18_2013 Tracheal aspirate 100% AH18 May 23, 2013 KF600651
Al-Hasa_19_2013 Nasopharyngeal swab 100% AH19 May 23, 2013 KF600632
Bisha_1_2012 Nasopharyngeal swab 99·8% BS1¶ June 19, 2012 KF600620
Riyadh_3_2013 Respiratory swab 99·8% RY3 Feb 5, 2013 KF600613
Al-Hasa_21_2013 Throat swab 99·8% AH21 May 30, 2013 KF600634
Hafr-Al-
Batin_1_2013
Nasopharyngeal swab 100% HB1 June 4, 2013 KF600628
MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. *Proportion of genome obtained compared with a full 
genome value of 30 119 nucleotides. †Code used in ﬁ gure 2; single letter codes refer to patients from Assiri and 
colleagues.16 ‡Patient described by Albarrak and colleagues.24 §Patient described by Memish and colleagues.25 ¶Same 
patient providing sample for van Boheemen and colleagues.26
Table 1: MERS-CoV genome data
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was calculated and compared with the expected number 
of mutations in view of the time elapsed between the 
sampling dates of each pair. Because the number of 
mutations between two sequences accords with Poisson 
distribution, rejection of the epidemiological linkage 
between the two is considered if the observed number of 
mutations falls outside of the 95% upper conﬁ dence level 
in the cumulative density function. To account for the 
many independent comparisons, a Bonferroni correction 
was applied, adjusting the signiﬁ cance level to 3·85 × 10–³.
Temporal dynamics of MERS-CoV were assessed with 
time-resolved phylogenies using the Bayesian Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo method in BEAST version 1.7.5.20 
Because of the close epidemiological relation between the 
nine Al-Hasa isolates, the cluster was collapsed to the 
earliest isolate (Al-Hasa_2_2013) resulting in a ﬁ nal set of 
11 MERS-CoV isolates before generating molecular clock 
phylogenies. A second alignment of only-coding regions 
(ORF1ab, S, ORF3, ORF4a, ORF4b, ORF5, E, M, and N), 
was used for selecting codon-position substitution models. 
The most appropriate evolutionary model was established 
by comparing the marginal likelihood of diﬀ erent models, 
estimated using the path-sampling approach implemented 
in BEAST. The HKY+Γ4 substitution model was selected as 
most appropriate, with separate rates for the three codon 
positions, under an uncorrelated lognormal molecular 
clock21 and a ﬂ exible Gaussian Markov random ﬁ eld 
Bayesian skyride coalescent.22
The geographical locations of ancestral nodes in the 
time-resolved phylogeny were inferred with a discrete 
phylogeographical diﬀ usion model; Bayesian stochastic 
search variable selection identiﬁ ed the statistically 
signiﬁ cant transition rates between locations. Both 
symmetrical and asymmetrical substitution models were 
tested in combination with either a geographical-
distance-informed model, in which the transition rate of 
a virus between locations is inversely proportional to the 
distance between them, or a strict model, with equal 
rates between all locations. Marginal likelihood values 
for each model were estimated using path-sampling, and 
Figure 2: Bayesian-inferred phylogeny of all 21 new sequences
Combined with the published genomes (EMC/2012 [GenBank number JX869059], Jordan-N3 [KC776174], Munich/AbuDhabi [KF192507], England-Qatar_2012 
[KC667074], Al-Hasa_1_2013 [KF186567], Al-Hasa_2_2013 [KF186566], Al-Hasa_3_2013 [KF186565], Al-Hasa_4_2013 [KF186564], and England2-HPA 
[no number available]). The single letter patient codes from Assiri and colleagues16 are given where appropriate. Clade A, clade B, and the Al-Hasa cluster are 
marked with vertical bars. Aminoacid changes along the internal branches were established though likelihood-based ancestral state reconstruction. These are 
shown above the branches and colour-coded by ORF. The scale bar below the phylogeny shows the genetic distance, in substitutions per site, from the arbitrary 
midpoint root. Bayesian posterior probabilities for each clade are given above the relevant node. MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. 
ORF=open reading frame.
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employed in the Bayes factor comparison to establish the 
better supported model. There was no diﬀ erence between 
the four models (Bayes factors <3), so in view of the 
limited number of sequences and locations, the sym-
metrical substitution model under equal rates was 
chosen to reduce the risk of over-paramaterisation.
Positively-selected sites in the MERS-CoV genomes 
were detected with the mixed eﬀ ects model of evolution 
implemented in HyPhy23 to calculate the ratio of 
synonymous to non-synonymous substitutions (ω) for 
each codon, allowing this ratio to vary between the 
branches of the alignment’s phylogenetic tree to detect 
occurrences of episodic selection, where the site under 
selection only occurs on a subset of samples on a speciﬁ c 
lineage in the phylogeny.
Role of the funding source
The sponsor of the study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or 
writing of the report. The corresponding author had full 
access to all the data in the study and had ﬁ nal 
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Results
Sequencing of the MERS-CoV needs conversion of the 
30 000 nucleotide RNA genome to DNA using reverse 
transcription and subsequent PCR ampliﬁ cation. Fig-
ure 1 shows a typical set of successful reverse trans-
cription PCR amplicons. The amplicons for each sample 
were pooled for Illumina sequencing as described in the 
methods section. Coverage of the resulting short-reads 
across the MERS-CoV genome was assessed by mapping 
a random 100 000 read subset to the Al-Hasa_1_2013 
genome (ﬁ gure 1), where the average coverage for all 
samples was shown to be greater than 3 × 10³. After de-
novo assembly, genomes were validated by ensuring that 
the expected open reading frames (ORFs) were intact 
(ﬁ gure 1). This method was used to generate complete or 
partial genomes from 21 MERS cases with sample 
collection dates from June, 2012, to June, 2013 (table 1).
The phylogenetic relation of the Saudi Arabian MERS-
CoV sequences was assessed in combination with the 
nine published MERS-CoV genomes. The earliest 
reported MERS-CoV genomes are from June, 2012, from 
a patient in Bisha (EMC/2012),26 and a retrospectively 
identiﬁ ed Jordan patient from April, 2012 (Jordan-N3). 
These two genomes seem distinct and are provisionally 
grouped here in a separate clade A (ﬁ gure 2). The 
EMC/2012 sequence was obtained after extensive cell 
culture passage to establish a virus isolate;26 there are 
76 single nucleotide diﬀ erences between EMC/2012 and 
the root of the clade B lineage. EMC/2012 and Jordan-N3 
share 44 nucleotide changes not present in any other 
known MERS-CoV genome. Because of the lack of 
reported technical details for the Jordan sequence, the 
tissue culture adaptation of EMC/2012, and the shared 
polymorphisms despite large diﬀ erence in geographical 
origins of clade A, we focused our analysis on sequences 
obtained directly from patient material, namely those 
in clade B. Importantly, genome Bisha_1_2012 
(ﬁ gure 2, in light green) was obtained with direct 
sequencing of nasopharyngeal swab material from the 
same patient reported as the source of the EMC/2012 
virus (ﬁ gure 2, in light green).26
A time-resolved phylogeny was generated from all 
epidemiologically unlinked viruses with genome 
coverage greater than 70% (ﬁ gure 3). The tightly-linked 
Al-Hasa cluster was collapsed to a representative isolate 
(Al-Hasa_2_2013) along with the Al-Hasa_8_2013 isolate 
that was determined to be epidemiologically unrelated 
(ﬁ gure 4, table 2). Geographical locations of the ancestral 
viruses were co-estimated along with the phylogeny, to 
assess the spatial evolution of the virus. These results 
suggest the circulating virus in Saudi Arabia is centred 
around Riyadh, with sporadic excursions to other centres; 
the most probable geographical location for all of the 
internal nodes, except for the Al-Hasa outbreak, is in 
Riyadh (ﬁ gure 3). However, with the exception of the 
ancestor to the Al-Hasa outbreak, the posterior probability 
on these ancestral geographical locations is low, high-
lighting the degree of uncertainty on these inferred 
locations. The number of isolates for each location is 
small, with only Riyadh and Al-Hasa having more than 
one isolate. Because the two Al-Hasa isolates cluster 
together, the positioning of Riyadh along the internal 
branches could be due to it being the only location 
present at many distinct positions in the topology. 
Figure 3: Time-resolved phylogenetic tree
Based on the concatenated coding regions of the MERS-CoV genome. Branch colours show the most probable 
geographical location for that branch, established with a discrete traits model implemented in BEAST version 
1.7.5.20 Change in branch colour shows a change in geographical location during its evolutionary history. Node 
labels show the posterior probability for the inferred geographical location at that node. Asterisks show nodes with 
>0·95 posterior probability support for that clade. The posterior probabilities on the geographical location of the 
root are Al-Hofuf 0·03, Riyadh 0·48, Buraidah 0·04, Bisha 0·18, Abu Dhabi 0·05, Doha 0·13, Hafr-Al-Batin 0·04, 
and Makkah 0·04. MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
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Figure 4: Transmission analysis
Proposed transmission network for all available Al-Hasa MERS-CoV genomes. The light blue nodes show genomes with at least one statistically possible transmission 
linkage to a known MERS-CoV genome (transmission cases). The coloured nodes in the bottom panel (sporadic cases) are MERS-CoV genomes that cannot be linked 
by direct transmission to any known MERS-CoV case. Genomes are organised by date of sample collection, and stays in hospital A or D are shown by grey horizontal 
bars. Red squares show potential transmission, either by shared dialysis session or by direct exposure to a known MERS case. Black arrows show proposed 
transmission pairs supported by the sequence data, dashed red arrows show proposed transmission pairs not supported by the sequence data. The expected number 
of diﬀ erences between each pair of sequences was calculated as the product of the interval between sampling, the evolutionary rate of the virus, and the maximum 
common length between the two virus genomes. Assuming that the number of diﬀ erences between two sequences over a length of time is Poisson distributed, with 
λ equal to the expected number of mutations, the probability of getting the observed number of mutations between the two sequences by chance can be calculated 
from the cumulative density function of the Poisson distribution. A transmission pair was rejected if the cumulative probability value was less than 0·05. A Bonferroni 
correction was applied to account for multiple comparisons, resulting in an adjusted signiﬁ cance level of 3·85 × 10–³. ASR=ancestral sequence reconstruction as 
deﬁ ned in table 2. MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
Δ time (days) Recorded substitutions Expected substitutions p value* (X≥observation)
ASR vs B 34 0 1·869 1
ASR vs F 28 3 0·714 3·58 × 10–²
ASR vs G 30 2 1·494 4·40 × 10–¹
ASR vs H 28 1 1·436 7·62 × 10–¹
ASR vs I 19 0 1·045 1
ASR vs J 18 1 0·985 6·26 × 10–¹
F vs K 0 3 0 NA†
G vs X 6 7 0·139 1·76 × 10–¹⁰‡
G vs M 1 4 0·018 4·55 × 10–⁹‡
J vs Q 16 8 0·332 2·74 × 10–⁹‡
K vs V 8 0 0·422 1
Q vs T 5 9 0·106 4·00 × 10–¹⁵‡
X vs Y 2 7 0·057 3·50 × 10–¹³‡
MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. ASR=likelihood-based ancestral state reconstruction of the root of the Al-Hasa clade. *p values for accepting or rejecting 
the null hypothesis are signiﬁ cant at the 0·05 level, after using the Bonferroni correction to adjust the p value for each hypothesis to 3·85 × 10–³. †The samples from F and K were 
collected on the same day resulting in an expected substitution value of 0. Therefore no conclusions could be made for this pair. ‡Transmission pair not statistically supported.
Table 2: MERS-CoV genome variation in support of human transmission pairs
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However, although the posterior probability on the root 
node being Riyadh is low (0·48), it is still more than 
double that of any other location, suggesting that the low 
probabilities are due to the small number of genomes 
(the legend of ﬁ gure 3 lists the posterior probabilities). 
Additional genomes will be needed to improve con-
ﬁ dence in these inferences.
Estimation of the evolutionary rate for this expanded 
number sequences shows MERS-CoV evolving at 
6·3 × 10–⁴ substitutions/site per year (95% highest 
posterior density [HPD] 1·4 × 10–⁴ to 1·1 × 10–³) estab-
lishing the time to most recent common ancestor for 
clade B (excluding EMC/2102 and Jordan-N3) as July, 
2011 (95% HPD July, 2007, to June, 2012).
Single nucleotide diﬀ erences between all MERS-CoV 
genomes were assessed (ﬁ gure 5). In this analysis, all 
available MERS-CoV genomes were aligned and the 
nucleotide at each position was compared with the 
nucleotide at the same position in the earliest genome, 
Bisha_1_2102. Many nucleotide changes were in the last 
third of the genome; if these changes result in aminoacid 
changes they might alter important accessory proteins as 
well as the receptor-binding spike protein encoded at 
nucleotide positions 21 000–25 500. Selection analysis of 
the 11 epidemiologically unlinked MERS-CoV genomes 
was done to detect evidence of natural selection in the 
MERS-CoV genome. Using the mixed eﬀ ects model of 
evolution method, codon 1020 in the spike gene was 
identiﬁ ed as being under episodic selection (p=0·021) 
along the branch between the main Saudi Arabian lineage 
and the Munich/AbuDhabi/2013 cluster. The isolates in 
the Munich/AbuDhabi/2013 cluster have a histidine at 
this position, whereas those in the Saudi Arabian lineage 
have an arginine (ﬁ gure 2). The presence of an arginine at 
this position in the Saudi Arabian lineage suggests a 
potential cleavage site for the endosomal protease furin27 
or for trypsin-like proteases.28,29 Because of the possible 
role of spike protein cleavage in potentiating membrane 
fusion and coronavirus entry,30 and previous observations 
on SARS coronavirus spike evolution,31,32 the phenotypic 
eﬀ ect of this change should be established.
Evidence was sought for multiple, distinct zoonotic 
introductions into human beings of MERS-CoV 
compared with a single introduction of clade B with 
Figure 5: Single nucleotide diﬀ erences between the Bisha_1_2012 genome and all other genomes
Diﬀ erence shown by vertical coloured bars. Grey=gap in the query sequence. Orange=change to A. Red=change to T. Blue=change to G. Purple=change to C. The ORF 
map of the MERS-CoV genome with the major ORFs marked is provided above the ﬁ gure for reference. MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. 
ORF=open reading frame.
0 5000 10 000 15 000
Bisha_1_2012 genome position
20 000 25 000 30 000
Al-Hasa_7_2013
Al-Hasa_15_2013
Al-Hasa_9_2013
Al-Hasa_1_2013
Al-Hasa_12_2013
Al-Hasa_10_2013
Al-Hasa_22_2013
Al-Hasa_16_2013
Al-Hasa_8_2013
Al-Hasa_11_2013
Al-Hasa_14_2013
Al-Hasa_21_2013
Al-Hasa_3_2013
Al-Hasa_17_2013
Al-Hasa_19_2013
Al-Hasa_18_2013
Al-Hasa_4_2013
Al-Hasa_13_2013
Al-Hasa_2_2013
England2-HPA
Riyadh_2_2013
Buraidah_1_2013
Hafr-Al-Batin_1_2013
Riyadh_1_2013
Riyadh_3_2013
England-Qatar_2012
Munich/AbuDhabi
EMC/2012
Jordan-N3
Bisha_1_2012
ORF1A ORF1AB
ORF3
ORF4A
ORF4B M
ORF8BE
ORF5 N
S
Articles
2000 www.thelancet.com   Vol 382   December 14, 2013
sustained human-to-human transmission. The genome 
Riyadh_1_2012 was obtained from an early MERS patient 
in Riyadh on Oct 23, 2012.24 Genome Riyadh_2_2012 was 
from patient 2 in the Riyadh family cluster obtained 
7 days later on Oct 30, 2012.25 The two genomes are 
phylogenetically distinct and in view of the incubation 
periods of MERS-CoV16 suggest at least two distinct 
lineages were circulating in Riyadh in October, 2012.
15 of the new virus genomes from the Al-Hasa region 
form a polytomy with the previously described 
Al-Hasa_1_2013 through Al-Hasa_4_2013 cluster16 (marked 
Al-Hasa in ﬁ gure 2). These genomes were used to assess 
MERS-CoV transmission patterns in detail. In view of the 
rate of evolution for MERS-CoV, we tested the likelihood of 
the transmission network for the Al-Hasa cluster.16 
Although patient A was suggested to be the index case in 
Al-Hasa, transmitting to patient C and then onward, 
neither patient A nor C were molecularly conﬁ rmed 
MERS-CoV cases. The similarity of viruses from patients 
B, F, G, H, and I suggests that a closely related virus could 
be the important early virus in the outbreak.
We reconstructed the hypothetical ancestral sequence 
(ASR) of the Al-Hasa cluster as a surrogate for this original 
virus. Pairwise statistical assessment of epidemiologically 
deﬁ ned transmission events, in view of the observed 
genetic divergence of the virus genomes and the time 
intervals, supports eight of 13 proposed transmissions in 
the Al-Hasa outbreak16 (table 2); however, transmissions 
between the Al-Hasa patients G:M, G:X, X:Y, J:Q, and Q:T 
are not statistically supported (table 2, ﬁ gure 4), suggesting 
independent sources of infections within the Al-Hasa 
outbreak (ﬁ gure 4).
The geographical distribution and phylogenetic relation 
of MERS-CoV across time in Saudi Arabia was investi-
gated. The close phylogenetic clustering of the MERS-
CoV isolates from the Al-Hasa region is consistent with 
spread via human-to-human transmission. In addition to 
the Al-Hasa cluster, many well supported phylogenetic 
clades and singletons (hereafter referred to as genotypes) 
exist, possibly each from a separate zoonotic event (ﬁ g-
ure 2). These distinct genotypes, which include the 
Munich/AbuDhabi, England-Qatar, Riyadh_3 cluster; the 
Bisha-1, Riyadh_1 cluster; and the singletons Hafr-Al-
Batin_1, Riyadh_2, Buraidah_1, England2-HPA, each 
have strong statistical support, with Bayesian posterior 
probabilities of 0·87 or greater—often reaching 1·0.
Discussion
Our study presents the genetic analyses of the largest 
number of MERS-CoV genomes described so far (panel). 
The most important ﬁ ndings from this study are that at 
least two distinct lineages were circulating in Riyadh in 
October, 2012, and transmission patterns in the epidemic 
are consistent with both human-to-human transmission 
and sporadic zoonotic events. An updated evolutionary 
rate supports the circulation of MERS-CoV since the 
middle of 2011.
The 21 MERS-CoV full genome sequences provide 
greater detail in tracking MERS-CoV transmission. We 
also recreated the virus transmission pathways, with 
particular reference to the Al-Hasa cluster,16 to establish 
whether all MERS-CoV infections in people result from a 
single zoonotic transfer with subsequent human-to-
human transmission or if they are from many zoonotic 
events. Our data suggest that local spread of virus in the 
Al-Hasa outbreak might be more complex than previously 
thought, with additional sources of the virus contributing 
to hitherto human-to-human transmission chains. This 
is consistent with the multiple tree clusters described by 
Breban and colleagues11 and support their optimistic R0 
scenario for MERS-CoV.
MERS-CoV from the Al-Hasa region is consistent with 
spread via human-to-human transmission, with the 
initial case derived from a zoonotic event. In addition to 
the Al-Hasa cluster (ﬁ gure 2), multiple distinct MERS-
CoV genotypes exist, possibly each from a separate 
zoonotic event. These include the Munich/AbuDhabi, 
England-Qatar, Riyadh_3 cluster, the Bisha-1, Riyadh_1 
cluster, and the singletons Hafr-Al-Batin_1, Riyadh_2, 
Buraidah_1, and England2-HPA (Makkah). The Riyadh 
region shows three distinct MERS-CoV genotypes. In 
view of the evolutionary rate of the virus it is not expected 
Panel: Research in context
Systematic review
We searched PubMed, ProMed, and Genbank on Aug 15, 2013, for all relevant English 
language publications with the terms “Middle East respiratory syndrome”, “MERS-CoV”, 
and “HCoV-EMC” individually and in combination with the terms “sequence”, “genome”, 
and “phylogeny”. Articles relevant to our report are cited in the text. The phylogenetic 
relation of our 21 Saudi Arabian MERS-CoV sequences was assessed in combination with 
the nine published MERS-CoV genomes. The geographical distribution and phylogenetic 
relation of MERS-CoV across time in Saudi Arabia was reviewed. Geographical locations of 
the ancestral viruses were co-estimated along with the phylogeny, to assess the spatial 
evolution of the virus.
Interpretation
MERS-CoV full genome sequences provide greater detail in tracking transmission. There is 
little information about the molecular evolution of MERS-CoV and how this relates to virus 
transmission. MERS-CoV genomes obtained directly from 21 MERS patients from across 
Saudi Arabia show three distinct MERS-CoV genotypes in Riyadh. Phylogeographic analyses 
suggest the MERS-CoV zoonotic reservoir is geographically disperse. Selection analysis of the 
MERS-CoV genomes reveals the expected accumulation of genetic diversity including 
changes in the S protein. Multiple introductions of MERS-CoV were identiﬁ ed and suggest 
lower R0 values. MERS-CoV is evolving within the largely human-to-human Al-Hasa cluster 
but the phenotypic consequences of these variants needs assessment before adaption can 
be inferred. Transmission within Saudi Arabia seems consistent with either movement of an 
animal reservoir, animal products, or movement of infected people. Our results provide 
important and substantial genomic information on MERS-CoV and a direction for further 
investigation. That there were three genetically distinct lineages of MERS-CoV in Riyadh 
suggests it is unlikely that the Riyadh infections are the result of one, continuous 
human-to-human transmission chain. Further deﬁ nition of the exposures responsible for 
the sporadic introductions of MERS-CoV into human populations is urgently needed to 
provide the necessary information to interrupt transmission and contain the virus.
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that a single zoonotic event was the source of the epi-
demic. Such high local diversity could arise from 
zoonotic events in Riyadh if the MERS-CoV diversity in 
the animal reservoir is being continuously imported 
from other regions. Alternately, Riyadh is the largest 
population centre in Saudi Arabia and therefore the 
largest target for human-to-human transmission. The 
many circulating genotypes might be a consequence of 
the movement of infected people from other regions, 
this is supported by Riyadh_1_2012 clustering with 
Bisha_1_2012 and Riyadh_3-2013 clustering with viruses 
from Doha (England_Qatar_2012) and Abu Dhabi 
(Munich/AbuDhabi), the two largest urban centres in 
neighbouring countries (ﬁ gure 6).
MERS-CoV is evolving within the largely human-to-
human Al-Hasa cluster but the phenotypic consequences 
of these variants need assessment before adaption can be 
inferred. All recent MERS-CoV encoded S proteins diﬀ er 
from the well studied EMC/2012 S protein at codon 1020; 
therefore, the consequences of this change should be 
carefully monitored.
Calculations with this larger set of MERS-CoV 
sequences provide an estimate of the emergence of 
MERS-CoV in July, 2011, with a broad credible interval 
(95% HPD July, 2007, to June, 2012). Analyses using 
short sequences suggest that the MERS-CoV virus might 
have an ancestor in bats.7,10,14,26 Using the evolutionary 
rate from our study we show a substantial period since 
these viruses shared a common ancestor, suggesting 
that there might be an intermediary host as the source of 
human infections. MERS-CoV has not yet been identiﬁ ed 
in any animal sources. Therefore ﬁ eld studies of all 
probable reservoir species, including camels, bats, goats, 
sheep, dogs, cats, rodents, and others in Saudi Arabia 
and other Middle Eastern countries are ongoing. A 
history of contact of Saudi Arabian MERS-CoV patients 
with camels and goats has been reported in some cases. 
Serological testing for MERS-CoV has detected anti-
bodies to the virus in camels in Oman and the Canary 
Islands9 suggesting that a virus that stimulates antibody 
responses cross-reactive with MERS-CoV has been 
recently circu lating among camels; however, the only 
way to establish if the virus eliciting the antibody 
response is the same as human MERS-CoV is to isolate 
the MERS-CoV itself in a camel. Further, the recent 
reports of mild and asympto matic cases discovered 
through monitoring and testing of contacts of conﬁ rmed 
cases suggest that the focus on severe disease as a 
surveillance strategy might be missing substantial 
numbers of milder or asymptomatic cases.
Our results provide important and substantial genomic 
information on MERS-CoV and a direction for further 
investigation. That there were three genetically distinct 
lineages of MERS-CoV in Riyadh suggests it is unlikely 
that the Riyadh infections are the result of one, continuous 
human-to-human transmission chain. Further deﬁ nition 
of the exposures responsible for the sporadic introductions 
of MERS-CoV into human populations is urgently needed 
to provide the necessary information to interrupt trans-
mission and contain the virus.
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